1. Introduction
When “utilitarianism” is mentioned, Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) are undoubtedly the first to come to mind. However, it is possible to encounter theories that adopt utility as the basic criterion of human actions in both moral and legal terms in almost every tradition of thought. The Islamic philosophy is one of these traditions. In Islamic legal thought, the notion of utility is met with “
maṣlaḥa (pl.
maṣāliḥ)”.
1 The opposite of this concept is “
mafṣada (pl. mafāsid)”.
Maṣlaḥa is the abstract noun of the verb “ṣalaḥa”, which means ‘‘to repair or improve’’. Anything that helps prevent
mafsada and promotes human welfare is equivalent to
maslaha. Maṣlaḥa can be translated into English as “utility” and
mafṣada as “injury”. In a sense used by Islamic jurists,
maṣlaḥa corresponds to meanings such as “general good”, “public interest”, or “social well-being” (
Khadduri 1991, p. 738). However, the meaning of
maṣlaḥa is much broader than in utilitarianism.
Maṣlaḥa not only encompasses benefits in this world but also includes benefits in the hereafter. Moreover, it prioritizes benefits in the hereafter over those in this world.
The first discussions on
maṣlaḥa in the Islamic intellectual tradition can be traced back to the 8th and 9th centuries. Although there are differences of opinion on this issue, it is known that the evidence of
al-maṣāliḥ al-mursalah2 (unrestricted interests) has an important place in the methodology of Abū ʿAbdillah Mālik ibn Anas (712–795). While the term
maṣlaḥa is not explicitly mentioned in Malik’s writings, his students reported examples where the concept of
maṣlaḥa was used as a basis in legal reasoning (
Khadduri 1991, p. 739). In terms of the first discussions after Mālik ibn Anas, however, we find one of the earliest discussions in Abū Bakr al-Jaṣṣāṣ (917–981), a member of the Ḥanafī school, one of the most important schools of Islamic law. Al-Jaṣṣāṣ defines
maṣlaḥa as the acquisition of utility and the removal of harm. According to him, the general purpose of legal definitions and rulings should be for the utility of people. God’s decrees and commands to His servants are all in the interest of human welfare. Later, Islamic jurists widely accepted the al-Jaṣṣāṣ approach (
Haçkalı 2010, pp. 55–56).
Abū al-Maʿālī ʿAbd al-Malik al-Djuwaynī (1028–1085), Imām Abū Hāmid Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Ghazālī (1058–1111), ʿIzz Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām (1181–1262), and Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (1229–1285) are the leading Islamic jurists who came to prominence after al-Jaṣṣāṣ in discussions about
maṣlaḥa. Among them, al-Ghazālī was the one who initiated the widespread use of the concept of
maṣlaḥa. Like al-Jaṣṣāṣ, al-Ghazālī argues that the ultimate purpose (
maqṣad, pl.
maqāṣid) of God’s judgments and commands is to preserve the following five essentials: religion, human life, reason, generation, and property. According to him, anything that protects and promotes them is
maṣlaḥa (good), and anything that harms them is
mafṣada (bad) (
Opwis 2005, pp. 55–56;
Reysuni 2019, p. 49). Al-Ghazālī’s definition of
maṣlaḥa appears to be the first concrete jurisprudential definition of
maṣlaḥa (
Opwis 2017, p. 10). ʿIzz Ibn ʿAbd al-Salām was the first thinker to study
maṣlaḥa in Islamic legal thought in a broad and detailed manner. He claims that, in principle, all divine law can be reduced to the principle of attaining good and avoiding evil. In other words, God’s only aim when issuing any command or ruling is the welfare/utility of human beings (
Opwis 2017, p. 12).
Abū Isḥāq al-Shāṭibī (1320–1388), the subject of this article, is a significant figure in the development of the theory of maṣlaḥa in Islamic legal thought. There is no doubt that when it comes to the theory of maṣlaḥa, other Islamic thinkers could be the subject of an article. However, the fact that al-Shāṭibī made maṣlaḥa the foundation of legal thought, addressed this theory in detail, influenced modern Islamic legal thought, and is one of the first thinkers that come to mind when discussing the theory of maṣlaḥa today has made al-Shāṭibī the subject of our article.
His full name is Abū Isḥāq Ibrāḥīm b. Mūsā b. Muḥammed al-Shāṭibī. Almost nothing is known about his family or childhood. Al-Shāṭibī was born in 1320 in Granada, where he received all his education and passed away in 1388 (
Masʿud 1975a, p. 147). Al-Shāṭibī was a jurist and adhered to the Mālikī school of Islamic law. The Mālikī school stands out from other Islamic legal schools due to its special interest in the objectives of Islamic law and its legal reasoning (
Masʿud 1975b, p. 65) What led al-Shāṭibī to focus on
fiqh was his belief that the inadequacy of
fiqh in the face of social change largely stemmed from methodological and philosophical deficiencies. According to him, unless the true nature of legal theory were examined, the formalism of law would remain disconnected from reality (
Masʿud 1975a, pp. 149–50). Al-Shāṭibī argues that if jurists fail to grasp public interests, they will be unable to understand the purpose behind the rules and principles set by God (
Ebrahim 2016, p. 319). Al-Shāṭibī took a great interest in these societal changes. This interest led him to question the purposes and objectives of Islamic law. Thus, the theory of
maṣlaḥa emerged because of this questioning. Al-Shāṭibī’s understanding of
maṣlaḥa forms the foundation of his Islamic legal philosophy. His definition of
maṣlaḥa as the purpose and objective of Islamic law has made this concept a functional principle of Islamic legal theory. In this regard, the theory of
maṣlaḥa is al-Shāṭibī’s attempt to validate the adaptability of Islamic legal theory to societal needs. A proper evaluation of this theory is only possible by investigating it within the framework of the structure and the structural form that al-Shāṭibī established (
Mesud 1997, p. 147). In other words, al-Shāṭibī developed the concept of
maṣlaḥa as reasoning that justifies the applicability and expandability of Islamic law to changing circumstances, and he also presented it as a fundamental principle for the universality and certainty of Islamic law (
Eickelman 2000, p. 390).
His innovative views sparked significant debates, which continued even after his death. After a long pause, his views regained popularity in the modern era and profoundly impacted modern Islamic thought. The primary reason for the resurgence of al-Shāṭibī’s opinions in the contemporary period is the rapid social, political, economic, and other changes that emerged. Contemporary modernist Muslims have not hesitated to adopt his ideas. However, traditionalist circles have displayed an ambivalent attitude. While some have approached his views with sympathy, others have distanced themselves from his ideas, fearing they might harm the existing paradigm (
Ebrahim 2016, p. 318).
Al-Shāṭibī discussed the theory of maṣlaḥa in all its aspects in his work al-Muwāfaqāt. Therefore, this work forms the primary source of our study. This work is of great importance in studying the theory of maṣlaḥa because it offers a structured approach to understanding the objectives of Islamic law, integrates both traditional and modern legal methodologies, and has significantly influenced historical and contemporary Islamic legal thought. The contributions of this work are of undeniable importance for researchers of Islamic law.
This article on al-Shāṭibī’s theory of maṣlaḥa consists of two parts. In the first part, al-Shāṭibī’s theory of maṣlaḥa will be discussed in general terms. In the second part, al-Shāṭibī’s theory of maṣlaḥa will be compared with Bentham and Mill’s utilitarian theory. This study does not claim that there is an interaction between the two traditions, or that al-Shāṭibī, who lived chronologically earlier, is the intellectual ancestor of Bentham and Mill. We also do not intend to argue between classical utilitarianism and al-Shāṭibī’s theory as to which is more correct. We are trying to reveal how the concept of utility is handled in two different traditions of thought and what the original points are.
2. Al-Shāṭibī’s Theory of Maṣlaḥa
Consistent with classical utilitarianism’s definition of utility, the concept of
maṣlaḥa, which forms the basis of al-Shāṭibī’s theory, generally means utility, pleasure, goodness, and beauty.
Maṣlaḥa refers to the order of life in this world.
Mafṣada, which means harm, pain, evil, ugliness, etc., is the opposite of
maṣlaḥa (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 25–36;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 120). According to al-Shāṭibī,
maṣlaḥa is the criterion of the rightness and wrongness of actions in moral and legal terms. In this context, an action is right if it involves a good and wrong if it does not (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 385;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 387–88). Similarly, al-Shāṭibī’s thoughts on human psychology are the same as those of Bentham and Mill. According to al-Shāṭibī, the concern for pleasure and pain underlies all actions of human beings, who have a selfish nature. For this reason, man seeks his own interest and pleasure in all his actions and (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 172;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 173) will never turn to something he thinks will harm him (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 333;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 334).
As a Muslim thinker, al-Shāṭibī believes in God. Therefore, his belief in God gives his theory its essential shape. This belief leads to some important differences between his theory and those of Bentham and Mill. For him, God is an omnipotent, omniscient, perfect, benevolent, and merciful being. God created the universe and man out of nothing. Man is sent into this world to be tested by God. God will reward those who do the morally right actions in the next life and punish those who do the wrong ones. Therefore, according to al-Shāṭibī, man’s purpose in this world is to obey God’s commands and attain God’s promised rewards in the next life.
In all His commands and prohibitions, God is concerned with the benefit of human beings. These commands benefit human beings while at the same time protecting them from possible evils. Therefore, for him, the main reason behind God’s permitting (
halal) or forbidding (
haram) an action is to ensure the benefit of human beings (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.a, p. 195;
Şatıbi 1999a, p. 192). At this point, al-Shāṭibī’s reasoning can be briefly stated as follows: al-Shāṭibī claims that there can be two reasons why God commands something: it is either (i) for God himself or (ii) for human beings. The first possibility is impossible because God, as a perfect being, does not need anything. That leaves the second option. But here, we encounter a new problem. Since God’s command is for human beings, how can we know that it is for the benefit of human beings? Al-Shāṭibī states that in this new situation, we are faced with three possibilities: God’s command is either (a) beneficial, (b) harmful, or (c) both beneficial and harmful for human beings. Al-Shāṭibī argues that the second and third of these three possibilities cannot be possible. Al-Shāṭibī’s main argument here is the verses in the Qur’ān. Many verses of the Qur’ān explicitly state that God looks out for the benefit of His servants. On the other hand, it is not possible for God to have commanded something for both the benefit and the harm of human beings. In this case, God would be doing a meaningless act, which contradicts His being a perfect being. Therefore, there remains only one possibility: God commands everything for the benefit of human beings (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.a, pp. 238–39;
Şatıbi 1999a, p. 236). However, al-Shāṭibī draws attention to a critical point and argues that this does not entail any necessity for God. According to him, God is not concerned with the benefit of His servants as an ontological necessity but because of His mercy. As an omnipotent and free being, God has unlimited power and authority in everything He does (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 379;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 382).
Therefore, God’s purpose is not to put people in difficulty but to ensure their benefit and protect them from greater evils that may occur. Al-Shāṭibī argues that the punishments God mentions for those who disobey His commands are an example of this. These punishments prevent people from violating God’s command, deter them from committing evil acts, and serve as an example to them. These punishments are likened to a doctor cutting off a gangrenous organ to save a patient or administering bitter medicine to cure a patient. Just as it cannot be said of a doctor that he wants to inflict pain on his patient, so it is the same with God (
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 147). God’s primary purpose is never to punish. Sometimes, God even permits behaviors that he would normally forbid under certain circumstances. For example, God allows starving people to eat normally forbidden food (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 155–56;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 154). Thus, when God gives a command, he looks for the benefit to outweigh the harm (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 26–27;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 26). In short, God gives commands because of the benefits, not because of the harm they entail (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 122–23;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 123).
Al-Shāṭibī argues that
maṣlaḥa, the fundamental quality that makes an action right, cannot be known by reason. The main reason is that
maṣlaḥa and
mafṣada are relative, not absolute. According to him, nothing in the world has value in itself. Everything is equal in value, and there is nothing that is good or bad in itself. For this reason,
maṣlaḥa and
mafṣada differ according to the person, time, and place. What is good for one person may be bad for another, and what is good for the same person one day may be bad for him another day. All this shows that, according to al-Shāṭibī, human beings have nothing to do with whether something is
maṣlaḥa or
mafṣada. If this were the case, something good for human beings should not turn into evil under any circumstances (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 39–40;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 38–39). Therefore, both
maṣlaḥa and
mafṣada are dependent on God. Only one cause distinguishes the beings in the world from each other, establishes a hierarchy among them, makes them good and bad, and makes these things either good or bad for humans, and that is God (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 315;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 315).
Another reason for the inability of human beings to know the
maṣlaḥa and
mafṣada with their intellect is the limited nature of human beings. According to al-Shāṭibī, the establishment of commands and prohibitions about anything necessitates the construction of universal principles. However, this is beyond human reason. God has created human beings in such a way that they cannot know what the benefits and disbenefits in this world and the world after death are and how they can be achieved. Human nature is incomplete at this point (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 333;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 334). As evidence for this view, he cites the verse, “And Allah brought you out of the wombs of your mothers while you knew nothing, and gave you hearing, sight, and intellect so perhaps you would be thankful.” (al-Nahl 16/78) (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.a, p. 179;
Şatıbi 1999a, p. 172). Therefore, man has no other way but to resort to God’s revelation to know the benefits and disbenefits in religious and worldly matters (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.c, pp. 146–47;
Şatıbi 1999c, p. 141). If, despite this, man still claims that he is able to understand the benefits and disbenefits, he has overstepped his boundaries. In this case, he would claim that reason is superior to revelation, which, according to Al-Shāṭibī, is unacceptable (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 48–49;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 46).
However, this approach should not lead us to conclude that al-Shāṭibī renders reason entirely ineffective regarding human actions. On the contrary, he considers reason the most significant quality that holds humans accountable before God. For without reason, religion—and thus God’s commandments—would have no meaning for humans. If
maṣlaḥas and
mafṣadas were confined solely to this world, al-Shāṭibī argues, humans could discern them through intellect and experiences. However, if
maṣlaḥas and
mafṣadas are not limited to this world; they also have aspects that extend to the afterlife. Since the afterlife lies beyond the boundaries of reason and experience, it is impossible to comprehend the whole nature of
maṣlaḥa without the guidance of revelation. Furthermore, as otherworldly
maṣlaḥas are more critical and prioritized over worldly
maṣlaḥa, the need for reason to rely on revelation becomes even more critical (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 48;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 45).
In fact, according to al-Shāṭibī, this is the reason why God sent prophets to human beings (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.a, pp. 349–50;
Şatıbi 1999a, p. 353). There were periods when God did not send prophets to human beings. al-Shāṭibī argues that when no prophet was sent, people were not exposed to revelation and had to resort to reason as the sole determinant of expediency and wrongdoing. It has been seen that in these periods, people departed from justice and truthfulness. They abandoned or changed the truths that had been revealed to them by the prophets in previous periods. These periods were periods of chaos and confusion for humanity. This is proof that reason alone is inadequate in determining good and bad (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 48;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 45). Another proof, according to al-Shāṭibī, is that God excuses the mistakes of people in societies where He did not send prophets (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 304;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 304).
In fact, on this matter, al-Shāṭibī takes a position within the long-standing debate in Islamic thought known as the ‘good (
al-ḥusn) and evil (
al-qubḥ)’ discussion. One side of this debate is the
Ashʿarites, who attribute goodness and evil to God’s judgment, while the other is the
Mu‘tazilites, who attribute God’s judgment to goodness and evil. Accordingly, the
Muʿtazilites argue that the intellect can know the good and evil in things, while the
Ash‘arite thinkers object to this view and say that reason does not have such a power. Therefore, according to them, unless God’s address to something is known, reason alone cannot know whether it is good or bad. As the reader will immediately realize, al-Shāṭibī’s position is close to that of the
Ashʿarites. On the other hand, he claims these two positions defend a fundamentally similar position (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 56–58;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 52, 53). While the
Mutazilites consider it obligatory for God to believe the good when commanding something, the
Ashʿarites, although they do not see it as obligatory, see it as a favor of God. The main difference here is whether this is necessary for God or not. Otherwise, both sides agree that God desires the good of the servants.
In al-S̲hāṭibī’s system, the view that the
maṣlaḥa can only be known through God’s revelation makes obedience to God’s command the ultimate goal for human beings. Accordingly, obeying God’s command is the only way to achieve happiness. Therefore, man is responsible for observing God’s command in all his actions, whatever they may be. Al-Shāṭibī argues that there are two primary sources of human actions and that it is impossible to speak of a third source other than these: (1) human desires and (2) God’s commands. For al-Shāṭibī, the latter is the legitimate source (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 169–70;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 170, 174). Al-Shāṭibī states that God’s commands are divided into two primary and secondary commandments: (2-i) and (2-ii). God prioritizes the general interest in the primary and self-interest in the secondary commandments. Therefore, the primary commandments are universal and do not change according to person, place, time, or space (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 176;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 178). Thus, primary commandments often conflict with secondary commandments. By fulfilling the secondary commandments, people ensure their direct interests. Since secondary commandments are compatible with human desires, human nature has strong motivations towards them. Therefore, God generally does not mention any reward for these commandments and is content with natural motivations. In His wisdom and mercy, God, who created everything in an orderly fashion, has arranged the behaviors that satisfy human needs in a way that brings pleasure to people. When people are hungry and thirsty and need shelter, they want to meet these needs. According to al-Shāṭibī, if God had willed it, He could have required people to abandon their pleasures or commanded them to do things opposite to their inherent motivations. But God has shown favor to His servants, allowing them to satisfy their needs (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 179–81;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 181–82).
Therefore, in al-Shāṭibī’s system, the ultimate goal of man’s actions is to prioritize God’s commands over his own desires and wishes. When it comes to any action, it is unacceptable to prioritize one’s pleasure over God’s command and to make one’s interest the primary goal (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 174–76;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 176, 199, 202). This is because, as mentioned above, man was created to worship God, that is, to serve God. The essence of servitude is obedience to God’s commands. In this context, intention is the most important element. al-Shāṭibī argues that it is the intention that makes an action worship. According to him, what determines whether an action is worshiped or not is one’s intention towards the action. Therefore, the action must conform to God’s command not only in terms of form but also in terms of intention. This is because an action may appear outwardly by God’s command, but if the agent’s intention is not to obey God’s command, it is not righteous (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 324–25;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 325). In other words, any intention that contradicts God’s command is worthless (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 129;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 129).
On the other hand, the fact that some of God’s commands are opposed to human desires should not lead us to conclude that God is an anti-pleasure being. If taking pleasure in actions would make those actions wrong, then actions done in the hope of heaven would also be bad. God promised people paradise in return for righteous actions and directed them to obey his commands through their paradise pleasure. In this sense, if demanding pleasure from any action would remove the value of the action, it would undoubtedly be mentioned in the Qur’an (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 210–11;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 210). However, God has not given humans unlimited freedom in terms of pleasure. Man is free to pursue his pleasure within the limits set by God (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 146;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 144). Because pursuing pleasure without measure is a behavior worthy of animals, if God had allowed the unlimited pursuit of desires and wishes, anarchy would have dominated the world. The balance of life would be disturbed, and in such a world, it would not be possible to take the right actions that would lead to the rewards of the next life. This is opposed to what God intended. Human history confirms this. Virtually all societies and traditions have opposed unlimited freedom, and such people have been vilified by society (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 39–40, 170;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 38, 171).
What God expects from human beings in the matter of pleasure is to prefer God’s command when individual pleasure and God’s command conflict. In other words, the ultimate goal of God’s commands is to enable people to serve Him of their own free will (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 168;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 169). In fact, according to al-Shāṭibī, it is not possible to prohibit pleasure completely. If God were to forbid pleasure altogether, it would undoubtedly be a command that is beyond human power. This would not be by God’s wisdom and would mean that God would contradict Himself, for God Himself has put this tendency towards pleasure into human nature (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 215–16;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 215–16). Al-Shāṭibī sees God’s prohibition of clerical life as an expression of this (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 133–34;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 133). According to him, clericalism is not God’s command. Those who live a clerical life do not isolate themselves from pleasure. On the contrary, they consume their lives pursuing their desires and wishes. This is because people sometimes sacrifice lesser pleasures to obtain greater pleasures. The best example is people who spend money to get a position of authority. According to al-Shāṭibī, pleasures such as becoming famous, becoming a leader, and gaining respect from people are the main goals of those who devote themselves to clerical life (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 200–1;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 201). The main reason God imposes certain limitations on people in obtaining pleasure is that He wants the welfare of people not only in this world but also in life after death (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 172;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 174). This is because the welfare of life after death is superior to the welfare of this world. While the good of this world is mixed with wrongdoing, this is not the case for the good of the next life. Therefore, no good in this world is absolute good or absolute evil. This world is built on a mixture of two opposite extremes, good and evil. Therefore, when it comes to the worldly good, what is meant is the predominance of good over evil. However, the interests in the afterlife are pure interests that do not involve harm (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 25–26;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 24–25). When worldly and otherworldly interests conflict, the preference should be for the otherworldly ones. Therefore, the interests aimed at God’s commands are mostly the interests of the afterlife. (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 38;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 37).
al-Shāṭibī argues that man cannot survive on his own due to his selfish nature. God did not create man to be self-sufficient. Therefore, humans must necessarily live and cooperate with their fellow human beings (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 179;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 181). This leads to a conflict of self-interest and social interests, the problem that utilitarian traditions have the most difficulty solving. As stated above, while there are natural motivations for self-interest in human nature, it is impossible to talk about such motivations for general interest. In other words, while there is a natural pleasure in eating for a hungry person, there is not in sharing one’s food. This is why God does not obligate people to do things according to their natural inclinations; instead, God obligates them to do things not according to their natural inclinations. The foundation of the concept we call morality lies exactly at this point. The belief in God provides al-Shāṭibī with a straightforward solution to this problem. For al-Shāṭibī, God compensates for the lack of natural motivation in socially beneficial behavior with divine reward and punishment (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 181–83;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 183). God has imposed limits on self-interested actions through His commandments for human beings who have a selfish nature to establish a healthy relationship with society. God has set these limits so each individual can realize their best interest. This is why God says in the Qur’an, “Whoever does good, it is to their benefit. And whoever does evil is at their loss. Your Lord is never unjust to His creation” (al-Fussilat 41/46). In these commandments, God forbids actions that harm others and society. In many verses of the Qurʾān, He has stated that He will punish those who commit such acts in the afterlife. Al-Shāṭibī states that in line with these commands, people in Islamic societies who commit acts that harm others should be restrained from doing so. It is a religious, moral, and legal obligation for these people to compensate for the resulting damage (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 191–92;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 192–93). In this context, for al-Shāṭibī, the social interest is always superior to the self-interest in terms of the continuation of social life. When the interest of society is at stake, self-interest becomes secondary. For example, in the case of scarcity, the black market is not permitted, and one’s goods can be confiscated (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 349–50;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 352).
The concept that stands out in al-Shāṭibī’s self-interest and social interest conflict is the concept of “īsār.” Īsār refers to one’s preference for others over oneself. This behavior is described as “superior morality,” because here, a person renounces his pleasures and works for the benefit of other people. Here, one sees oneself as equal to different people (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 355;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 356–57). Al-Shāṭibī states that the verse “…They give the emigrants preference over themselves even though they may be in need…” (al-Hashr 59/9) describes these people. Their faith in God is very strong, and they know that God will reward them for their sacrifice in the afterlife (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 192;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 193–94). Al-Shāṭibī mentions that another motivation for these people is the love and respect of their fellow human beings. Thus, according to al-Shāṭibī, it is the responsibility of society to ensure the benefits of these people who sacrifice their benefits for the benefit of society. Society is obliged to fulfill the needs of such people (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 184;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 186). However, here, al-Shāṭibī draws attention to intention again. One’s intention in sacrificing self-interest in the face of social interest must be the love of God. If one makes this sacrifice not out of love for God but for the respect and love of society, then one’s behavior is immoral, because benevolence is preferring others to ourselves when circumstances require it. The demand for individual pleasure and benevolence do not go together (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 190, 357;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 191, 359). However, al-Shāṭibī also states that there is a limit to individual sacrifice and that God does not expect unlimited sacrifice from man. The behavior the person has to fulfill should never be at a level that will harm him/herself, and the benefit they will obtain should be more than the harm they will face. Otherwise, self-interest overrides social interest (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, pp. 366–67;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 370).
al-Shāṭibī mentions three types of maṣlaḥa:
(1) Essentials (
al-ḍarūrāt): These are the interests that ensure the maintenance of order in the world. With them, an orderly social life is possible. If these interests are absent, chaos will ensue in society (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 8;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 7). There are five obligatory interests: (i) the protection of religion (
al-dīn), (ii) the protection of the individual’s life (
al-nafs), (iii) the protection of the generation (
al-nasl), (iv) the protection of property (
al-māl), and (v) the protection of the reason (
al-ʿaql). Al-Shāṭibī states that these five
maṣlaḥas are not unique to Islamic societies but that all societies throughout human history have attached great importance to the protection of these
maṣlaḥas (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 10;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 10).
(3) Embellishments (
al-taḥsīniyyāt): Such
maṣlaḥas are necessary for the perfection of social life. Therefore, the absence of these maṣlaḥas causes far fewer problems in social life than the first two
maṣlaḥas (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 12;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 10–11).
According to al-Shāṭibī, there is a hierarchy among these three types of ends. The purpose of divine commands and prohibitions is mainly directed towards the first type of good. There is an asymmetrical relationship between these three types of maṣlaḥas. The disappearance of the essential goods leads to the disappearance of the other two goods, but not vice versa (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 16;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 15). Al-Shāṭibī cites Qur’ānic verses as evidence of this asymmetrical relationship between the goods. According to him, God’s punishment for unjustified killing, violations of security of life, adultery, theft, etc., is much more severe than the punishment for violations of the other two types of ends (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 299;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 299–300).
The most fundamental problem is what to do in a conflict between the necessary ends. Al-Shāṭibī solves this problem by resorting to the hierarchy of ends. He says the most fundamental of these five essential ends is protecting religion. The preservation of life follows it. For example, for the sake of protecting religion, the other four essential interests can be sacrificed, or theft can be committed while under the fear of death (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 299;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 300). While human life is preferred to property, religion should be chosen when human life confronts religion. Likewise, when the life of a single human being and the lives of many people are at stake, the life of a single human being must be sacrificed (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 39;
Şatıbi 1999b, pp. 37–38). Al-Shāṭibī’s approach to human life can be seen in the following example from Islamic legal thought. According to this example, if the infidels take a Muslim as their shield and the only way for the Muslims to win the war is to kill that Muslim, then that Muslim must be killed (
al-Sḥāṭibī n.d.b, p. 350;
Şatıbi 1999b, p. 352). However, there is a problem with this hierarchy. This problem is the question of priority between reason, generation, and property. While al-Shāṭibī is clear that religion and life are the first two
maṣlaḥas, al-Shāṭibī left the priority-succession relationship between reason, generation, and property ambiguous.
In the first part of the article, we have attempted to outline al-Shāṭibī’s theory in broad terms. In the second part, we will compare al-Shāṭibī’s theory with the views of Bentham and Mill, aiming to highlight the differences and unique aspects.
3. The Theory of Maṣlaḥa and Utilitarianism
In this section, there is a question that needs to be answered before making a comparison between the two theories. This question is whether al-Shāṭibī can be characterized as a utilitarian. In other words, are the common ideas that al-Shāṭibī shares with Bentham and Mill enough to make him a utilitarian thinker in the classical sense? The only way to answer this question is to reveal the basic idea/principle that would allow us to characterize any thinker as utilitarian. Al-Shāṭibī, like Bentham and Mill, argues that human beings have a selfish nature and that all their actions are based on pleasure-seeking. However, these commonalities allow us to characterize al-Shāṭibī as a hedonist rather than a utilitarian thinker. The main reason that Bentham and Mill are utilitarian thinkers is the principle of utility, which considers morally correct actions that seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people. Mill’s following statements are our basic starting point in this regard: “The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.” (
Mill 1969c, p. 210). In al-Shāṭibī’s system, the basic concept that fulfills the same function is the concept of
maṣlaḥa. As we have stated above, according to al-Shāṭibī, the morally correct action is the one that is in the interest of the general good. Just as Bentham and Mill consider selfish actions that prioritize self-interest ethically wrong when the necessary conditions are met, al-Shāṭibī defends a similar view in the same situation. Therefore, in our opinion, al-Shāṭibī’s approach provides enough justification to characterize him as a utilitarian thinker. However, in this section, we will focus on the differences rather than the commonalities. By examining how similar issues are addressed through similar principles in two different traditions, we will attempt to highlight the unique aspects of al-Shāṭibī’s theory.
It can be said that a comparison between al-Shāṭibī’s theory of
maṣlaḥa and utilitarian theory is, in a sense, a comparison between three utilitarian thinkers who can be characterized as theists, atheists, and agnostics. Besides certain common principles that lead us to call al-Shāṭibī, Bentham, and Mill utilitarians, there are also significant differences between these thinkers, and one of the most important reasons for these differences is their views on God. As a theist, al-Shāṭibī places God at the center of his utilitarian views, and belief in God determines the general contours of his utilitarianism. Although he did not make a definite statement on this issue, it is possible to speak of a consensus among researchers that Bentham was an atheist. Therefore, in Bentham’s theory, God is not a reference point when explaining or solving any issue. It may be more accurate to characterize Mill as an agnostic rather than an atheist (
Raeder 2002, p. 11). This position makes Mill more permissive towards the belief in God and other issues brought about by the belief in God. Although Mill does not accept the omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God of theists, he sympathizes with the idea of a God whose power is limited.
3 In fact, in answering one of the criticisms of utilitarianism, namely that it is godless, Mill states that utilitarianism is a theory compatible with the conception of a God who is concerned with the happiness of human beings (
Mill 1969c, pp. 222–23).
Many differences are caused by the conception of God among the three thinkers. However, we will focus on four of these differences: (i) the relation between utility and reason, (ii) the basis of morality, (iii) happiness, and (iv) the conflict between self-interest (interest) and social interest (duty).
(i) The first is whether utility, can be known by reason. Al-Shāṭibī claims that utility can only be known by God’s command, not by reason. This claim also points to the human need for revelation and prophets. For Bentham and Mill, this claim is unacceptable. For both thinkers, the essential quality that makes an action right or wrong is pleasure, and the quality that makes it bad is pain. Pleasure and pain are the only good and bad things in themselves. Apart from this, for Bentham and Mill, the concepts of good and bad have no meaning (
Bentham 1962a, pp. 1, 48;
Mill 1969c, p. 210). Since pleasure and pain are directly open to human experience, it is within human capabilities to decide whether actions are morally right. Every human being, whether peasant, illiterate, prince, or philosopher, knows pleasure and pain because they can directly experience them. Therefore, for Bentham and Mill, there is no need to appeal to God’s revelation or a prophet in any way. Because the main issue here is determining what is right, Bentham and Mill think they have an infallible criterion: the principle of utility. If God is as the theists claim, and righteousness is conformity to God’s command, then God’s command and the principle of utility must be compatible (
Bentham 1962a, pp. 11, 58). If it is assumed that God wills anything, God must need a reason for it. The reason that best suits the infinitely merciful and good God of the theists would be the greatest happiness of human beings (
Bentham 1962b, p. 412;
Mill 1969c, p. 222). As can be seen, Bentham and Mill reversed al-Shāṭibī’s asymmetrical relationship between God’s will and utility in the solution of this issue. While al-Shāṭibī claims that God’s command determines utility and does so with absolutely free will, Bentham and Mill think that utility must determine God’s command and that a God who wants to be righteous, merciful, and good must do so out of necessity. According to both thinkers’ approaches, discussing God’s freedom here is impossible.
(ii) The second difference concerns the foundation of morality. Bentham and Mill argue that grounding morality in a supernatural power such as God, as al-Shāṭibī does, would lead to complete arbitrariness in the field of morality. According to Bentham, believing in a God who decides arbitrarily and gives unpredictable orders would have highly destructive consequences for morality. All processes of proof and refutation in this field would be irreparably distorted. Complete chaos will prevail in the field of morality.
4 For Bentham, this would stop the individual’s moral development and lead him to laziness. Bentham asks: “Why should a man employ the slow and toilsome methods to which experience chains him down, when the pleasure which he seeks may be purchased by a simple act of prayer?” (
Beauchamp 1822, p. 107). Mill also approves of these criticisms of Bentham. Mill, like Bentham, argues that the justification of morality by God would lead to destructive consequences for morality. If this is done, the sphere of morality will be wholly sanctified, and moral commands will be protected from criticism and debate. Therefore, morality will be made a part of religion, and imperfect moral commands will have a universal binding force by taking advantage of the claim of universality of religious commands. Moreover, according to Mill, morality will become dull and uniformized in a place where the origin of morality is linked to the supernatural. Mill points to the dulling of the Muslim legal system as an example (
Mill 1969b, p. 417).
(iii) The third difference arises regarding how happiness can be achieved. Al-Shāṭibī’s claim that the utility of actions cannot be known by reason makes man dependent on revelation for the attainment of happiness. In this case, obedience to God’s command becomes the only way for man to achieve happiness. Therefore, obedience to God’s command becomes the ultimate goal of man. Happiness here is almost like a by-product of obedience to God’s command. Moreover, even if God’s command is obeyed, God is free to do anything and gives happiness to whomever He wants. Happiness, in al-Shāṭibī’s system, is a divine gift in the favor of God. For Bentham and Mill, this is an unacceptable idea because both thinkers clearly state that the ultimate goal of human beings is happiness. According to Bentham and Mill, since man can decide the rightness or wrongness of actions by using reason, he does not need God’s help in achieving happiness. All processes that will lead to happiness are within the power of human beings. This is what the principle of utility is for. The basis of these views of Bentham and Mill lies in their approach to human psychology. According to both thinkers, it is impossible for man to desire something not in his own interest. For this reason, neither Bentham nor Mill considers it right that man should be morally obliged for something he does not desire (
Bentham 2002, p. 121;
Mill 1969c, p. 238). At this point, al-Shāṭibī’s promise of paradise in the afterlife to make God’s commandment desirable for man does not solve the problem for Bentham and Mill because both thinkers agree that human beings have only one life due to their conception of God and that happiness is a goal that can only be achieved in this life. Therefore, al-Shāṭibī’s claim that God sends man to this world to be tested does not make any sense for Bentham and Mill.
5(iv) The fourth difference manifests itself in the conflict between self-interest (interest) and social interest (duty), which is one of the most critical problems of utilitarianism. al-Shāṭibī takes advantage of his being a theist and appeals to God to solve the problem. Here, God, as the guarantor of the system, solves the problem of man’s non-existent natural motivation towards the social good by promising rewards in the next life to the individual who sacrifices his personal interest for the common good. Thus, since man believes that God will compensate for the loss of pleasure resulting from his sacrifice, he is motivated to such actions. Since Bentham and Mill do not accept God as a point of reference in their theories, they are deprived of this kind of convenience in solving the problem. Both thinkers resort to the idea that there is a harmony between self-interest and social interest in solving this problem. However, they think differently about how to achieve this harmony. Bentham tried to solve the problem mainly through law (external sanctions) and Mill through morality (internal sanctions). In a sense, while Bentham replaces God with law, Mill replaces God with morality. However, it should be noted that neither Bentham nor Mill disregards the importance of internal or external sanctions. For example, Bentham states that the legislator cannot make people do everything through sanctions and, therefore, needs the help of a moral philosopher. Moral philosophers should convince people about the harmony between individual and social interests. Bentham mentions four sanctions: physical, political, ethical, and religious (
Bentham 1962a, p. 14). Here, even if he does not believe in God, Bentham’s mention of religious sanction shows that he recognizes the influence of religion.
6The theories that solve the problem concerning God, such as al-Shāṭibī’s solution, lead human beings to selfishness. When self-interest is sacrificed for social interest, people expect paradise, which, according to Mill, is immoral. According to him, the solution is a matter of time and education. Mill believes that although man has a selfish nature, he can build a second nature with social tendencies in his character with the proper education (
Mill 1969c, p. 229). Individuals should be taught, especially from childhood, to control their desires and passions in an ascetic-like manner, to face dangers, and to voluntarily submit to suffering as simple educational exercises. In this way, they will be able to apply the virtues to their lives and gain the habit of being useful to others and society. Considering the pleasures to be obtained in the long term for this cause, the short-term suffering of the individual is of no importance. Societies may utilize sanctions as a temporary solution until they reach this ideal state. When people are kept away from harmful actions by sanctions, they will tend towards the right actions, and their awareness of this issue will gradually develop (
Mill 1969a, pp. 339–40).
Undoubtedly, the differences between these two theories go beyond the four topics we have discussed. However, considering the purpose of this study, these differences provide us with enough data to express our fundamental idea. Considering these common points and differences, it can be said that the original aspect of al-Shāṭibī’s theory is the triple hierarchical distinction he makes between maṣlaḥas: essentials, exigencies, embellishments. We do not encounter this classification in the theories of Bentham and Mill. According to Bentham and Mill, the moral rightness or wrongness of any action can only be determined based on a comparison made on the principle of utility. Therefore, for both thinkers, it is not possible to categorically claim the absolute superiority of any type of action over others. For instance, even the moral correctness of saving a human life can only be determined after a comparison of pleasure and pain. This approach provides Bentham and Mill with a certain flexibility in resolving moral issues. After all, in such an approach, nothing is considered untouchable. Everything, including sacred and religious values, is subject to a pleasure–pain comparison. However, this flexibility also brings about certain problems. The most significant of these problems is that this pleasure–pain comparison can sometimes morally approve actions that wound the conscience or are unacceptable to it. For example, in cases where the public interest is at stake, utilitarianism, in principle, approves the sacrifice of the individual. However, for al-Shāṭibī, God’s commands, and consequently religious principles, are categorically excluded from any pleasure–pain comparison. For example, when it comes to religion, all other principles and actions are categorically secondary. This approach is a necessary consequence of al-Shāṭibī’s theism. In fact, such an approach also makes al-Shāṭibī’s utilitarianism debatable. However, what keeps him within the boundaries of utilitarian theory is the nature of God’s commands. Because al-Shāṭibī believes that God’s commands ultimately aim at the well-being (maṣlaḥa) of people, it can be argued that the categorical hierarchy of principles in his classification implicitly rests on a pleasure–pain comparison. According to this perspective, God’s commands ensure both worldly and otherworldly benefits for humans and protect them from harm. From this point of view, when the categorical superiority of religion over human life is examined, it becomes evident that the basis of this superiority lies in the belief that religion provides far greater benefits for humanity than human life itself. Therefore, the hierarchy in al-Shāṭibī’s system is not fundamentally inconsistent with the approach of Bentham and Mill. However, it must be noted that for al-Shāṭibī, the categorical superiority in this hierarchy is based not on a pleasure–pain comparison but on God’s command. That is, even if there were a conflicting situation in the pleasure-pain comparison, al-Shāṭibī would still maintain this hierarchy as it is.
However, an important point should be underlined here. This tripartite distinction is not an original distinction of al-Shāṭibī. As we mentioned in the introduction of our study, this distinction also exists in the works of pre-Shāṭibī Islamic thinkers. Therefore, it would be a much more accurate approach to consider this distinction as an original contribution of the Islamic intellectual tradition to utilitarianism. This original contribution is a candidate to contribute to solving some moral dilemmas within utilitarian thought. However, considering that al-Shāṭibī’s theory is an entirely God-centered theory, the biggest problem that his theory faces is the issue of proving God’s existence. Unless this problem is resolved, the solutions proposed by al-Shāṭibī and utilitarian thinkers like him who ground their theories in God will continue to be debated. In short, al-Shāṭibī’s theory, as Sidgwick conceptualizes it, cannot be said to be able to save the cosmos of duty from chaos (
Sidgwick 1874, p. 473).
This study shows that utility is so functional in evaluating actions that, as mentioned above, it is possible to find moral and legal theories based on this concept in almost every tradition. However, based on the fact that similar ideas have been expressed in two different cultures and periods, it should not be concluded that British utilitarianism was influenced by al-Shāṭibī or any other Islamic thinker or that utilitarianism originally belongs to Islamic thought. Similar ideas can also be found in East Asian cultures such as China and India.
7 These similarities between theories demonstrate not an interaction between traditions but rather the functional effectiveness of benefit-based thinking in solving social problems.
4. Conclusions
Today, when we think of utilitarianism, the first thing that comes to mind is English utilitarianism. However, theories that use utility as a criterion for determining the rightness or wrongness of human actions can be found in nearly all intellectual traditions. One of these traditions is Islamic thought. In Islamic thought, the theory that uses utility as a criterion for evaluating actions is the theory of maṣlaḥa. One of the most well-known figures associated with this theory, which traces its roots back to the early periods of Islamic thought, is al-Shāṭibī.
This article compares al-Shāṭibī’s theory with the theories of Bentham and Mill. It is also a comparison of the utility-based theories of a theist (Shāṭibī), an atheist (Bentham), and an agnostic (Mill).
According to al-Shāṭibī’s theory of maṣlaḥa, if an action contains public interest, it is considered right both morally and legally; if it does not, it is wrong. For al-Shāṭibī, the purpose of human beings is to obey the commands of God, the Creator of everything, the all-knowing, and the omnipotent, to achieve eternal happiness in the afterlife. With His infinite wisdom and mercy, God ensures the benefit of humans in all His commandments. The prohibitions and punishments set by God have one single aim: to protect His servants from the sufferings of this world and the hereafter. Since humans, due to the limited nature of their intellect, cannot fully understand what constitutes true benefit, they need God’s revelation in this regard. Therefore, for al-Shāṭibī, there is only one way to achieve happiness: to obey God’s commands. By nature, humans cannot live alone; thus, they need others for survival. At the same time, being inherently selfish, humans often face a dilemma between their own interests and the interests of society in social life. In such cases, al-Shāṭibī argues that humans must sacrifice their own interests for the greater good of humanity. Al-Shāṭibī mentions three types of maṣlaḥa: essentials, exigencies, and embellishments. There is a hierarchical order between them. The most important of these are the essentials, which refer to five essential benefits: (i) the protection of religion, (ii) the protection of life, (iii) the protection of generation, (iv) the protection of property, and (v) the protection of reason.
Although al-Shāṭibī’s theory shares some similarities with the theories of Bentham and Mill, there are also significant differences between these theories. Common points among the thinkers include accepting utility as the basic standard of rightness, the synonymy of utility and pleasure, and the notion that all human actions are based on pleasure and pain due to human beings’ selfish nature. However, the differences can be summarized under four main headings: (i) the relationship between utility and reason, (ii) the foundation of morality, (iii) happiness, and (iv) the conflict between personal interest and public interest.
(i) On whether the utility can be known through reason, Bentham and Mill differ from al-Shāṭibī. Unlike al-Shāṭibī, both thinkers argue that utility can be known through reason. (ii) While al-Shāṭibī grounds morality in God, Bentham and Mill oppose this idea, arguing that it would make moral principles unquestionable, thus rigidifying morality. (iii) al-Shāṭibī claims that the only way to achieve happiness is to obey God’s commands and that ultimate happiness is in the afterlife, not in this world. Bentham and Mill, however, disagree with Shāṭibī on this point. According to Bentham and Mill, humans can achieve happiness through their efforts without needing God’s revelation. Furthermore, for Bentham and Mill, there is only one life: this life. Therefore, the only attainable happiness is happiness in this life. (iv) Al-Shāṭibī resolves the conflict between personal and public interests through recourse to God. According to him, an individual who sacrifices their personal interest for the benefit of society will be rewarded by God in the afterlife for their selflessness. Since Bentham and Mill do not refer to God in resolving moral issues, their approach differs from al-Shāṭibī’s. Both thinkers fundamentally argue that there is harmony between individual and societal interests. According to them, what is good for society is also good for the individual. The issue lies in individuals’ inability to perceive this harmony. Both thinkers contend that individuals will recognize this harmony more clearly as the level of development in societies increases.
In this comparison, the original aspect of Shāṭibī’s theory lies in his classification of maṣlaḥa into three categories: essentials, exigencies, and embellishments. Such a classification is not found in the theories of either Bentham or Mill. However, since similar classifications can be found in earlier Islamic thinkers, it would not be accurate to attribute this originality solely to al-Shāṭibī. Therefore, it would be more correct to interpret this classification as an original contribution of Islamic thought to the utilitarian tradition. Al-Shāṭibī’s contribution here is best understood as the systematic incorporation of this classification into his theory of maṣlaḥa.
All that has been discussed shows us that, despite having different languages, cultures, traditions, and beliefs, societies face similar problems and find solutions. This indicates that every society has much to learn from other cultures and traditions. Moreover, attempting to establish a teacher–student relationship or a direct influence between thinkers who provide similar answers to problems arising in different cultures and societies seems to be a pointless effort.
