Having established Speculative Realism as my framework for inquiry, it is crucial to clarify the core concepts that underpin this philosophical approach. Specifically, I must describe the diverse positions within SR itself and define object and spiritual, which are central to our argument and frequently subject to varied interpretations.
3.1. Speculative Realisms
SRs are not monolithic. SR writ large is a loose allegiance of philosophical positions, grouped initially via a workshop at Goldsmiths, University of London, in 2007 featuring Ray Brassier, Iain Hamilton Grant, Graham Harman, and Quinten Meillassoux. At this time, they all had “a willingness to re-interrogate or to open up a whole set of philosophical problems that were taken to have been definitively settled by Kant, certainly, at least, by those working in the continental tradition” (
Brassier et al. 2007, p. 308).
Since then, many philosophers have been deemed Speculative Realists, including Ian Bogost, Levi Bryant, Steven Shaviro, Jane Bennett, and others, while some—e.g., Brassier—have washed their hands of it (
Brassier 2011). Graham Harman “mourn[s] the loss of the umbrella term ‘speculative realism’” but holds that because they are “no longer reduced to alliance under a single banner, the speculative realists now have a chance to wage friendly and futuristic warfare against one another” (
Harman 2011, p. 21). There are—despite this contention—three core aspects that all SRs share: first, all SRs are realisms in that they are “committed to the existence of a world independent of the human mind;” second, they are all speculative because “unlike the commonsensical realisms of yesteryear, [they] reach conclusions that seem counterintuitive or even downright strange;” third, they all reject correlationism, which gives minds—particularly humans’—the sole privilege of constructing the only meaningful reality (
Harman 2018b, pp. 3–5). This final rejection brings to mind Berkeley’s maxim
esse is percipi—“being is to be perceived;” Berkeley took this to mean that there is no thing-in-itself, only thought (
Berkeley [1710] 2014, p. 30). Correlationists hold that we can only know three facts about the thing-in-itself, per Kant: “the thing-in-itself exists, that the thing-in-itself is thinkable as non-contradictory…[and] that the thing-in-itself is not identical to the space-time phenomenon,” and thus, the thing-in-itself warrants no further study as we already know all we can of it (
Brassier et al. 2007, p. 448).
Rather than fall in line behind either Berkeley or Kant, Speculative Realists hold—some more explicitly than others—that there is a difference between the Real and the Sensual. In the context of Speculative Realism, the Real refers to that which exists independently of our minds and perceptions. It is the world as it is in itself, not as it appears to us. The Real contrasts with the Sensible, which is our subjective experience and perception of the world or how objects appear to us. Speculative Realists argue that philosophy should strive to understand the Real and that the Sensible is a barrier to understanding the Real, as our individual perspectives and limitations influence it.
Because SRs are anti-correlationist, they also push back against the primacy of the anthropocentric and hierarchical (human) subject/object model, favoring pan-, a-, or metacentric, democratic
object/
object relationships between any two interactants. This is not to say that Speculative Realists wish to remove the subject/object relationship. Instead, they want to democratize it. Doing so would require two acknowledgments. First, that objecthood has primacy over subjectivity. All subjects are objects. Second, humans are not the sole, or even standard, model of subjective objects. Thus, they advocate for a “flat ontology,” which rejects the idea that some beings have greater existential importance than others. They avoid any system that puts any one type of entity—like humans—at the top. Instead, they propose that all objects “equally exist, but do not exist equally” such that “the funeral pyre is not the same as the aardvark; the porcelatta is not equivalent to the rubgy ball. Not only are neither pair reducible to human encounter, but also neither are reducible to one another.” (
Bogost 2012, p. 11;
2010). This is to say that each object is a unique combination of components and capabilities but none is existentially greater than any other object. This position, as a matter of course, also applies to the powers associated with the experience of subjectivity.
Further, Speculative Realists hold that because Kant “defines the horizon of contemporary philosophy,” i.e., all contemporary philosophy is post-Kantian “not merely in the historical sense of succeeding Kant, but philosophically, in that it is defined by the coordinates set by Kant for philosophical activity,” Kantianism “must be overcome if a new era of philosophy is to emerge” (
Harman 2018b, p. 60;
Grant 2006, p. 9). Thus, some Speculative Realists challenge the dominance of critique and in contemporary philosophy, advocating for a return to being “first philosophers”—i.e., undertaking an inquiry into the nature of being as compared to merely commenting or critiquing other philosopher’s stances (
Bryant 2011b, p. 262).
Despite these core agreements, the Speculative Realist movement encompasses a wide array of philosophical perspectives. Indeed, the diversity of thought within SR is so significant that, as Harman notes, “not a single philosophical hero [was] shared by the group as a whole” at the initial Goldsmiths workshop (
Harman 2018b, pp. 4–5). To illustrate this diversity and set the stage for the subsequent discussion, let us examine the individual stances of some of its originating figures, including Brassier’s Transcendental Nihilism—also called Prometheanism, Grant’s Transcendental Materialism—known at the time of the Goldsmith’s workshop as Vitalism Idealsim, Harman’s Object Oriented Ontology (OOO)—called Object-Oriented Philosophy at Goldsmith’s, and Meillassoux’s Speculative Materialism. I will also summarize Bennet’s Vital Materialism as it is relevant to this paper. Finally, I will bring the explanation of SR to a point by summarizing my views—tentatively named Sacred Realism.
3.1.1. Transcendental Nihilism and Prometheanism
Although he was the first to speak at the Goldsmiths workshop, Ray Brassier now denigrates SR, calling it “actor-network theory spiced with pan-psychist metaphysics and morsels of process philosophy” and saying that those who support SRs are trying to “concoct a philosophical movement online by using blogs to exploit the misguided enthusiasm of impressionable graduate students” (
Brassier 2011). However, Brassier’s position remains similar to other SRs in that it critiques correlationism (
Goddard 2016, p. 61). He draws on eliminative materialism to argue that correlationist positions are a flawed and limited understanding of reality (
Goddard 2016, p. 60). Actual confrontation with the Real necessitates a move beyond these limitations, even if it leads to the dissolution of the human-centered perspective.
Brassier’s position hinges on the idea that science can access the radically imminent Real, which he understands as a void or nothingness. He argues that “the only non-dogmatic position is able to recognize the extra conceptual difference between objects and concepts” within scientific representation, which also forms the basis for such a representation (
Bryant et al. 2011, p. 9). He does not mean that the Real is ineffable, because he says to be so would separate it from philosophy, but rather that it is “inexhaustibly effable as what determines its effability,” meaning “it is not a matter of concepts determining the Real, but of the Real determining the concepts appropriate to it” paralleling the idea that piety is pious because it is what pleases the gods (
Harman 2011, 167n17). He also holds that philosophy is the “organon of extinction” because the condition of life is that it gets extinguished (
Brassier 2007, p. 239). Thus, Thought is conjoined with Non-Being rather than Being, a radical challenge to traditional philosophical anthropocentrism. Grounded in the idea that “Nihilism is not…a pathological exacerbation of subjectivism,” but “the unavoidable corollary of the realist conviction that there is a mind-independent reality,” Brassier advocates for a stark confrontation with a meaningless, indifferent universe and a re-evaluation of humanity’s place within it (
Brassier 2007, p. xi). To Brassier, nihilism is not a lamentation of lost meaning but an emancipative “speculative opportunity” brought about by “the truth of extinction“(ibid). Recognizing a mind-independent reality—in the manner of Laruelle, who claims that “the Real precedes thought—in particular, philosophical thought—and is indifferent” to human concerns and values—allows for radicalizing the Enlightenment project (
Brassier et al. 2007, p. 418). It calls for a thought that extends beyond human self-pity and confronts the “disjunction between thought and reality” (
Thacker 2009, p. 459), even to the point of considering the “death of thinking” (
Goddard 2016, p. 62).
Prometheanism is the claim that “there is no reason to assume a predetermined limit to what we can achieve or to the ways in which we can transform ourselves and our world” (
Brassier 2019, p. 470). It calls for limitless human self-transformation through science and technology. This philosophy advocates for “subjectivism without selfhood,” where the pursuit of knowledge and transformation supersedes traditional notions of the self (
Brassier 2019, p. 471). It is a transgressive philosophy that seeks to challenge the boundaries between the human and the natural world as Prometheus transgressed the boundaries of Olympus and the mortal realm when he brought fire to humanity. Brassier’s Prometheanism is not a naive optimism about technology but a call toward the radical reorientation of human agency. It is a vision of humanity not as passive recipients of meaning but as active creators of their own destiny because, within a universe that does not care about humanity, we can make our destinies whatever we want them to be.
Brassier’s philosophies are primarily concerned with the natures of philosophy and thought, and they “aim[] at eliminating anything that might falsely make us feel at home in the world…[but] takes the destruction of meaning as a positive result” (
Bryant et al. 2011, p. 7) to offer a stark and challenging vision of humanity’s place in the universe. He calls for a radical rethinking of philosophical thought, away from anthropocentric concerns and towards a “realist” confrontation with the indifferent universe. He embraces both the nihilistic implications of this reality and the Promethean potential for human self-overcoming through science and reason. Thus, Brassier confronts the most unsettling aspects of existence—i.e., the facts that eventually existence itself will end, i.e., “Freud’s theory of thanatropic regression must be reinscribed on a cosmic level so that not only the organic dissolves in the inorganic but also the inorganic gains a dissipative or loosening tendency” in such a way that it too will die, and that all non-human aspects of the universe are indifferent to humanity—head-on, offering a vision of both the limits and the possibilities of human thought and action in a meaningless universe (
Negarestani 2011, p. 188).
3.1.2. Transcendental Materialism
Another founding perspective within SR is Ian Hamilton Grant’s Transcendental Materialism—called Vital Idealism at the time of the Goldsmiths workshop—which centers on a reinterpretation of Schelling’s nature philosophy, emphasizing nature’s dynamic and autonomous character. Grant’s views are neither an idealism in the usual sense, stating instead that ideas have a role in the “productive power of nature“—in which “nature is not a basis to which everything must be reduced but a basis from which everything is produced,” nor a traditional materialism, in that it rails against Aristotelian Matter in favor of a unique reading of Platonic Matter, arguing that we should stop attempting to overturn Plato but rather turn our attention toward undoing Kant (
Harman 2018b, pp. 5, 56 emphasis removed;
Lawrence 2007;
McWherter 2007, p. 49).
Grant’s position tapdances on the edge of scientism by claiming that “thought is produced by the world,” while differentiating itself from traditional idealisms, materialisms, and scientism by holding that “we [must] accept that there’s something prior to thinking, and that there are several layers of dependency amongst what is prior to thinking…an entire complex series of events” and that we cannot “draw direct causal links between the sub-cognitive processes of nature and their outcomes on the level of thought” “because the conditions that support the event that’s produced also support the production of other events” (
Harman 2018b, p. 55 emphasis removed;
Brassier et al. 2007, p. 334). This notion of causality tends toward the Deluzean “virtual” rather than the “mechanistic and linear” understanding of causality preferred by most naturalists (
Harman 2018b, p. 55).
For Grant, “being is simply power,” and nature is a self-organizing, productive, impersonal force, irreducible to individual objects or entities, but is instead an underlying principle of becoming (
Grant 2006, p. 28 emphasis removed;
McWherter 2007, p. 49;
Lawrence 2007). This force is “retarded or blocked in its flow, thereby giving rise to what we think of as individual objects [including the human object],” and “the genesis of objects necessarily occurs outside them, in a realm of productivity irreducible to fully constituted objects” (
Harman 2018b, p. 65;
Bryant et al. 2011, p. 9 emphasis removed). Thus, for Grant, two forces create the world: “[the] first force is the ‘principle of all motion,’ while the second or negative force retards the first, [and] their necessary union slows infinite becoming to the point of phenomenal production” (
Grant 2006, p. 142). In this way, Grant stands against what he calls “somatism“—i.e., the view that nature can be fully understood by examining the individual physical bodies and their actions, or “treating nature as a sum of actions of individual bodies,” especially Heidegger’s formulation of nature as “beings as a whole” and Kant’s “sum total of all things” (
Harman 2018b, p. 63;
Grant 2006, p. 7). To illustrate, Grant suggests that a volcano is not merely a physical object but a dynamic “force to be reckoned with” (
Shaviro 2011, p. 284).
Grant’s perspective challenges the prevailing Kantian paradigm and its prioritization of human experience and practical reason (
McWherter 2007, p. 49). Grant also criticizes Kantianism for its emphasis on human subjectivity and its limitations on understanding the natural world (
Lawrence 2007;
McWherter 2007, pp. 50–51). He argues that correlationism restricts the conceptual possibilities for a genuine philosophy of nature, advocating instead for the independence and autonomy of nature, drawing on Plato’s “indeterminate dyad” and Schelling’s “unconditioned I” to assert that it possesses a history and a dynamism that extend far beyond human comprehension or control. Grant’s philosophy is characterized by a “material vitalism” that challenges the traditional dualism between matter and life, i.e., that matter itself possesses a vitality and dynamism that are irreducible to mechanistic explanations (
Lawrence 2007).
For Grant, philosophy amounts to “a natural history of our minds” and has significant implications for understanding the relationship between humanity and the natural world (
Grant 2006, p. 104). It offers a compelling alternative to traditional post-Kantian philosophy. By emphasizing nature’s autonomy and dynamism, he calls for rethinking our anthropocentric relationship with nature and recognizing its value and power qua itself. His emphasis on nature’s character challenges correlationism and calls for rethinking our relationship with the natural world.
3.1.3. Object-Oriented Ontology
OOO is the most widely studied SR. Therefore, I will focus on the main points of OOO as a whole rather than specifically on the views of Graham Harman or any other object-oriented philosopher, such as Ian Bogost or Levi Bryant. OOO—called Object-Oriented Philosophy at the Goldsmiths workshop—is a prominent form of Speculative Realism. It asserts that all objects, whether living beings, inanimate objects, or even abstract concepts, equally exist. As Ian Bogost explains, OOO suggests that “nothing has special status” and that every object—from plumbers to sandstone—exists on an even playing field (
Bogost 2009).
OOO prioritizes aesthetic experience as a primary mode of cognition (
Harman 2018b, p. 91). This priority on aesthetics is evidenced through the Ontic Principle, which asserts that beings exist through their differences. This principle underscores existence’s inherent multiplicity and diversity, rejecting any reduction to a single foundational principle (
Bryant 2011b, p. 264). From the Ontic Principle comes the Principle of the Inhuman, which emphasizes the significance of non-human entities and forces in shaping reality, thereby challenging anthropocentric biases by “underlin[ing] the point that humans are beings among the swarm of differences and hold no special or privileged place with respect to these differences” rather than attempting to remove or demolish the subject in the manner of anti-humanist perspectives (
Bryant 2011b, p. 267). Consequently, OOO proposes a “flat ontology,” wherein all entities, irrespective of scale or complexity, possess equal ontological status—i.e., they “equally exist, but do not exist equally” or, in other words, “Being is composed of nothing but singular individuals, existing at different levels of scale but nonetheless equally having the status of being real” (
Bogost 2009,
2010).
Thus, OOO suggests a “weird realism” (
Harman 2018b, p. 92). This highlights reality’s inherent strangeness and elusiveness. Harman argues that true realism must acknowledge this strangeness. It should not capitulate to common sense or scientific reductionism. OOO’s framework of undermining—reducing an object to components, overmining—reducing an object to effects, and duomining—under- and overmining at the same time—further elucidates the limitations of both theory and practice in fully capturing the depth of objects (
Harman 2011, pp. 24–25). This perspective challenges Heidegger’s tool analysis, asserting that objects transcend their relations to human beings (
Brassier et al. 2007, pp. 369, 371;
Harman 2018b, pp. 93–94).
Harman’s model distinguishes between Real Objects (ROs), which “are not directly accessible to thought, perception, practical use, or even causal relation”, and Sensual Objects (SOs), which “exist only for some entity, human or otherwise,” as well as Real Qualities (RQs) and Sensual Qualities (SQs), which share a similar distinction (
Harman 2019). ROs interact with each other through SOs, which act as intermediaries or “sensual vicars” between RO, in the style of Islamic occasionalists (
Harman 2012, p. 201). Thus, objects combine in the following configurations: SO—SQ, RO—SQ, RO—RQ, and SO—RQ with each combination having particular phenomenological, epistemological, and ontological effects (
Harman 2018b, p. 97). Thus, OOO posits an
a priori metaphysics in which only objects are present.
When pool balls collide, says
Harman (
2018b), “the collision of these balls is really a question of both balls interacting only with the most superficial features of each other” (p. 95). Those “superficial features” are the material aspect of the balls made sensible via their material qualities—the SOs evidenced by their SQ. Materiality is the “sensual vicar” between the immaterial aspects of the balls, for the entire ball—rather than just its physical aspect—moves when struck by another (
Harman 2012, p. 201). In other words, the Sensual balls are made of matter; the Real ones are not. Thus, OOO is “the first materialism to deny the existence of matter” (
Harman 2002, p. 293 emphasis removed).
Thus OOO is an immaterialism. However, OOO does not hold that matter—i.e., that which gives physical objects their materiality—does not exist. Such a position would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, OOO rejects “the formless ‘prime matter’ thought by some to exist prior to any individual objects” and “the ‘pre-individual’ realm” (
Harman 2024). In other words, “What is real in the cosmos are [withdrawn] forms wrapped inside of forms, not durable specks of material that reduce everything else to derivative status” (
Harman 2002, pp. 171, 293). There are only objects, and when objects combine, they create new objects in the manner of Aristotelian substance (
Harman 2009, p. 211). This denial of matter as the sole basis for the existence of objects allows OOO to recognize abstract objects—e.g., capitalism and the number two—and fictional beings—e.g., Santa Claus and Scooby-Doo—as Real.
OOO also includes Bryant’s use of DeLandean “phase space,” defined as “the variety of states an object occupies at the level of its actualized qualities or properties,” such as how a pendulum swings across an arc but can only exist at any one position along the arc at a time (
Bryant 2011a, pp. 114, 89). Every object has the power to move between the phases of its phase space—i.e., the local manifestations—given certain relationships to other objects. Bryant, for instance refers to shining different lights on his mug to allow it to exercise its “coloring power” and display different local manifestations of color (2011, pp. 89–90). This model, says Bryant, shows how the “virtual proper being”—his counterpart to Harman’s RO—does, rather than has, different properties (2011, pp. 87–88).
2OOO’s emphasis on aesthetic experience and weird realism distinguishes it from other SRs. By advocating for the equal ontological status of all entities and acknowledging reality’s inherent strangeness via the Ontic Principle, the Principle of the Inhuman, an immaterialist tendency, and vicarious causation, OOO provides a framework for understanding the complex interplay of objects and their relations. While OOO may be seen as “weird” or counterintuitive, its commitment to exploring the depths of reality beyond human perception aligns with the overarching goals of SRs.
3.1.4. Speculative Materialism
Quentin Meillassoux’s Speculative Materialism is unique among Speculative Realisms. While he introduced the term
correlationism—the idea that we can only know the relationship between thought and being—he also acknowledges its strength (
Harman 2018b, p. 124). Meillassoux recognizes the “circle” of correlationism, which argues that we cannot think of an object outside thought without, in the very act of thinking, making it a thought (
Brassier et al. 2007, p. 413). The correlationist circle primarily rests on performative contradiction, which argues that claiming access to a mind-independent reality is self-contradictory, as the claim itself is a thought, leaving only a “logic of secession,” where correlationism is impenetrable and arguments for a “rich elsewhere” are dismissed as sub-philosophical (
Brassier et al. 2007, pp. 422, 423, 446–447). Meillassoux aims to radicalize correlationism from within, accepting the correlationist circle but rejecting its anti-absolutist stance (
Harman 2018b, 124;
Brassier et al. 2007, p. 427).
Meillassoux outlines a spectrum of philosophical positions on realism and anti-realism, ranging from naive realism—the belief that the world exists exactly as we perceive it—to subjective idealism—the position that reality exists only in our minds (
Harman 2018a, p. 15). He identifies his view as strong correlationism, which posits that while the concept of a mind-independent “thing-in-itself” is meaningless, such objects could still exist (ibid). Meillassoux argues that correlationism’s weakness lies in its opposition to both realist and idealist absolutisms (
Brassier et al. 2007, p. 428). While effectively countering realist claims of a mind-independent reality using the “circle of correlation” argument, correlationism struggles against idealist positions (ibid). Idealists, like subjectivists, argue that correlation is absolute, rendering a mind-independent reality nonsensical. This challenge highlights a potential contradiction within correlationism: to reject absolutism absolutely would align with idealism, while a non-absolute rejection would validate realism (ibid).
Meillassoux strengthens this position by positing that ontology is mathematical. Doing so allows him to make two moves. First, he revives the Cartesian distinction between primary and secondary qualities, arguing that an object’s primary qualities can be expressed mathematically (
Meillassoux 2014, p. 1;
Harman 2018a, p. 8). Unlike secondary qualities, primary qualities are independent of human perception and would persist even if all humans were to vanish. This position aligns with Meillassoux’s strong correlationist position and gives some evidence to the idea that there is an existence outside of the correlative that can be comprehended. Second, he leverages Cantor’s transfinite mathematics, which proves the existence of different sizes of infinity, to counter probabilistic arguments that assume stable natural laws must have a hidden reason (
Harman 2018a, p. 20).
Meillasoux’s formulation of the correlationist circle forms the basis for all SRs, though his admiration for the argument and insistence that mathematics is a basis for ontology make his position unique. While his argument that correlationism must collapse from within because it is absolutely anti-absolutist—i.e., it is against both idealism and materialism—is strong, most other Speculative Realists disagree with his argument.
3.1.5. Vital Materialism
Jane Bennett’s Vital Materialism differs from other SRs. She emphasizes “thing-power”—the agency and force of objects—rather than focusing on the thing-in-itself (
Bennett 2004, p. 2012). While Bennett’s approach is materialistic, it is also a form of realism, and as Meillassoux shows, being a Speculative Realist does not require rejecting materialism. Additionally, Levi Bryant includes Bennett among the “heroes of OOO and onticology,” and she and Harman have interacted with each other’s works (
Bryant 2011a, p. 27;
Bennett 2012). Most importantly, though Vital Materialism reaches its conclusions through unique means, it aligns with SRs by working against Kantian correlationism and recognizing that nonhuman existence extends beyond phenomena.
Bennett’s goal is to question not only subjective idealisms but also naturalistic materialisms by articulating a vibrant materiality that exists alongside and within humans through a political lens to see how the way we treat objects might change if we gave more consideration to the existential force and agency of nonhuman objects (
Gratton 2010, p. 159). She does so differently from McKibben—who holds that nature’s meaning lies in its independence from humans—and deep ecology—which sees humanity only as a part of nature (
Dobson 2011, p. 439). Her views tend closer to deep ecology, but she sees nature as “neither a smooth harmony of parts nor a diversity unified by common spirit” (
Bennett 2010, p. xi). Instead, she modifies Thoreau’s “wild” to incorporate “thing-power,” drawing on Deleuze’s “assemblage” (
Bennett 2004, p. 348).
Bennett’s Vital Materialism finds common ground with Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, where both humans and non-humans are considered actants with the ability to produce effects and alter events (
Bennett 2010). She highlights this with the example of worms, which she describes as political beings that “make history” by creating fertile soil, thus creating “an earth hospitable to humans” (
Bennett 2010, p. 95;
Dobson 2011, p. 440). To avoid a critique for this anthropocentric example, she employs John Dewey’s “public“—i.e., “a set of bodies affected by a common problem generated by a pulsing swarm of activities,” stating that all objects are equally members of a shared public (
Bennett 2010, p. 101).
Bennett uses Spinoza’s concept of conatus, which is the inherent drive or tendency of every object to continue existing. She describes it as “the trending tendency” or the “virtue” by which any object strives to persist (
Bennett 2010, p. 2). This idea suggests that all objects share this fundamental drive, making them equal in this respect and expanding membership in a public to all objects. She also introduces shi, which refers to the overall “mood” or “style” of a changing, interconnected system where every object influences and alters every other object. (
Bennett 2010, p. 35). In this way, conatus and shi leave the way open for “an animal, plant, mineral, or arifact” to “catalyze a public” and redefines
public as
an assemblage of conative members, challenging the anthropocentricity and correlationist tendencies found in most contemporary philosophies (
Bennett qt. Dobson 2011, p. 440).
3.1.6. Sacred Realism
Having explored the diverse landscape of Speculative Realism, including its various branches and key thinkers, it is important to introduce my own perspective within this framework. Sacred Realism is primarily—though not exclusively—influenced by OOO. Like other object-oriented philosophers, I hold that existence is neither constrained to material objects nor reducible to either components or functions. I am also in specific agreement with proponents of OOO that only objects exist and that abstractions, including—as will be discussed later—the relationships between objects, exist as objects. Further, I agree with Bogost that every object “exists equally”—i.e., existence works like a toggle switch, either on or off, there or not—regardless of its genus, even though their manner of existence and the amount of power each object has over itself and other objects vary (2012, p. 11). In this way, I—like other Speculative Realists—ascribe to a flat ontology. My main point of disagreement on this matter is with Bryant’s statement: “there is no being to which all other beings are necessarily related,” a statement that replaces anthropocentrism with an acentric perspective (2011b, 268). Instead, I advocate for a pan- or metacentric model in which all objects are necessarily related to all other objects, though some relations are indirect. This is where the “sacred” of Sacred Realism originates: hierarchical ontologies regularly posit a sacred being or set of such beings to which all others are related, I hold that ontology can be mapped with any object taking on this role, and thus, all objects are sacred.
3I, like Grant, am against somatism, but I am for recognizing the universe as the ultimate compound object—a monad in the Pythagorean sense. I can make this distinction based on Grant’s definition of somatism as the belief that nature is the combined actions of all bodies, “beings as a whole,” and the “sum total of all things” (
Grant 2006, p. 7). Meanwhile, I hold that the universe—a material object—is a compound object comprised of all other objects—a stance I will discuss at length in the sections on divinity and the four-dimensional model of the universe—and that nature is an abstract, correlationist concept defined as “the universe aside from humanity” per the natural/artificial split. Further, I hold that there is more to any compound object than its components—i.e., all objects are more than the sum of their parts, and thus, the universe is more than beings as a whole or the sum total of all things. This formulation of a monadic universe can be misconstrued as viewing the Real as an “unarticulated and immediately discernible One, which OOO obviously cannot endorse” (
Harman 2018b, p. 129). However, it would be more accurate to say that the Real is inarticulable and that the One-ness of it is discernable, not immediately, but rather upon close inspection in—as I will describe later—four dimensions rather than three.
Regarding the interaction of objects, Harman does an excellent job describing how SO and RO interact on the material plane with his example of the pool balls. However, I have two issues with his position. First, I believe that his ROs and SOs are not separate; they are aspects of the same object. The RO is the object as it exists independently, while the SO is how the object appears to us. The SO acts as a “sign” that points to the RO but does not fully reveal it, similar to how a signifier points to but does not fully capture the signified in Saussure’s linguistic theory. An example of the implications of this model is that if someone punches me in the face, they punch me. Also, if I lose a limb, I do not lose some of my essence, but my essence is affected. This example exposes a weird, but important point. On a sociopolitical level this stance avoids problematic issues surrounding disability. As I will discuss later, the essence of an object—its conatus—is countably infinite. When you remove members of a countably infinite set, the set remains countably infinite. The set of all positive integers is a standard example of a countably infinite set; every member of the set corresponds to a positive integer because they are each a different positive integer. However, the set of all positive even integers is also countably infinite, despite the fact that no odd integers are members of the set. If I lose a limb, the set of objects that comprise my body loses members, yet remains countably infinite.
My second issue with Harmon’s position on ROs and SOs is that he has yet to describe the sensual vicar and the superficial features of abstract—i.e., immaterial—objects. Thus, I will say that, for abstract objects, minds—which should be understood as any thinking object, not just humans, and concepts—i.e., the incomplete recreations of abstract objects within those minds—play the role of abstract vicars—a point I explain in more detail in the section on defining and describing the spiritual. While it would be correlationist to say that objects are brought into being by a mind, saying that abstract objects are made to interact via one is no more correlationist than it would be to say that one pool ball moves because the material aspect of another hits it. Minds can manipulate abstract objects as evidenced by my ability to use that capability to write this paper. Indeed, this paper—nor any other—could not have been written unless minds had that capability. Thus, we can say that concepts are the sensual aspects of abstract objects.
A final point on Harmanian ROs and SOs and their counterparts in Sacred Realism: ROs are necessarily abstract—as will be discussed in the next section—and thus intangible and transcendent of materiality. They present aspects of themselves via “sensual vicars,” and therefore, they have a level of immanence. Further, by constantly withdrawing, they make themselves inexhaustible. That inexhaustibility includes defying complete definition or explanation, meaning they are ineffable. These five traits, intangibility, transcendence, immanence, inexhaustibility, and ineffability—which I will collectively refer to as Divinity—are the primary traits of spirits across traditions. Therefore, I hold that ROs are spirits, regardless of whether their SOs are either material bodies or abstract concepts. And the spiritual refers to that which has to do with ROs.
Like Brassier and Meillassoux, I value scientific knowledge and mathematical reasoning. However, I believe that philosophy—as an object-oriented broadening of Grant’s views—must address both the material and the abstract. The physical sciences excel at describing the material aspects of objects. The social sciences effectively describe the mental aspects. Mathematics provides excellent descriptions of the behaviors and relationships between objects. However, contrary to Meillasoux and Grant, none of these can provide us with a complete picture of the identity of an object, especially when it comes down to multiple instances of identical objects, as mathematics and both the social and physical sciences continually fall prey to over-, under-, and duomining. This disagreement, of course, does not stop me from drawing on mathematics or sciences. Rather, I simply do not call on them as final arbiters of existence.
I believe, like Bennett, that—expanding again on Grant’s ontology—not only the universe writ large but each object within it has an experience qua itself, though—in the manner of OOO—I disagree that affectivity arises from materiality. After all, as I will discuss further, completely abstract objects, such as capitalism, massively affect other objects across the material and abstract modes. From this idea of affectivity without materiality, I derive the existence of the spiritual and, from there, the sacredness of individual objects and the universe.
3.2. Object
Having explored the various perspectives within Speculative Realism, it is now necessary to define one of its core concepts: the
object. After all, what is often meant by
object has become so commonsensical that it can be hard to put into words. First, I will draw on OOO, which holds—as stated above—an a priori metaphysics in which only objects are present. This position is contrary to those who believe there is a difference between a thing and an object—e.g.,
Kristie Miller (
2008) states, “things are ontologically innocent, objects are not,” “there exists a thing iff either there exists a simple particular [in the Russellian sense], or there exists a fusion of some simple particulars,” whereas “there exists an object if…there exists something that is posited by our folk ontology or best science,” in this way, (quoted in
McLaughlin 2023, 34n1). A thing “remains ill-defined until we discern what it does, that is until we grasp its relationship to the milieu in which it exists. At that point, we can say, ‘this thing is a glove, or an umbrella, or a tree,’ and it becomes an object with a world…A thing is an object waiting to happen” (
Morgan 2011, p. 254). A thing’s innocence arises from its unrecognizability, while an object is recognizable.
Miller’s definition strongly favors correlationism because the basis for the endowment of objecthood on a thing is its relation to a mind, as minds are necessary for creating an ontology or science. According to her, we can only ever say that a thing is recognized or unrecognized by a subject. As humans, it is easy to anthropocentrically conflate recognizability with being recognized by us. After all, if a tree falls in the forest and there is no one there to hear it, the sound waves still vibrate the air, stirring the branches of the surrounding trees. Further, it is possible for a “thing” to be recognizable—and thus to confer objecthood—to itself; thus, it is an object qua itself despite its dubious objecthood from an anthropocentric perspective. Therefore, it is impossible to be “ontologically innocent.” In this way, every thing is an object qua itself, and when an object is shifted from thingness into objecthood, it does not change. Instead, the observer and their ontological understanding of the object change. A change in understanding is not congruent to a change in the world. The world qua itself remains as it was. Thus, the difference between object and thing is subjective. That is not to say that the distinction is not helpful. Seeing what one object refers to as an object and what they refers to as a thing reveals ontological biases, such as anthropocentrism.
So, if the difference between
thing and
object only serves to reveal these biases, what of the difference between an
entity and an
object? In common usage, entity serves to mean
some object with subjectivity of an unrecognized kind—i.e., beings beyond our understanding, because of either supernatural or scientific ignorance. For instance, in
Star Trek: The Next Generation (
TNG), the crew of the Enterprise visits a planet wiped clean of all biological matter.
4 Later, they find out that a being they call the Crystalline Entity is responsible. Why do they call it an
entity? Why not an
anomaly or
being? It is because the characters recognize it as subjective but do not understand its subjectivity. It can plan and negotiate, but the nature of that subjectivity is beyond comprehension (
Lewin et al. 1988).
Another episode of
TNG provides an example of the entire hierarchical spectrum from
thing to
entity. In this episode, the Enterprise crew sees the Crystalline Entity just before it attacks. The following occurs:
| Across the darkened sky a white spot |
| of something is approaching—at an incredible speed: |
| 3 RIKER AND OTHERS |
| | stare at the object… Riker’s face suddenly shows an |
| | awful recognition, a terrible disbelief… |
| | | | | RIKER |
| | | | We’ve seen it before—we know |
| | | | what it is. Now get moving! |
| She stares at him, then turns and starts running. |
| STAR TREK: “Silicon Avatar”—REV. 8/2/91—TEASER 4A. |
| 4 ON THE SKY (OPTICAL) |
| | from Riker’s POV the approaching object has taken |
| | form… a huge crystal form descending toward the |
| | planet… a vast shimmering, faceted shape… ominous |
| | in its cold beauty. The Crystalline Entity advances |
| | on the outpost. (Conley et al. 1991, emphasis added) |
We start with a “something,” which eventually is recognized as an “object,” which in turn, when “stare[ed] at” becomes recognized—“We’ve seen it before”—as an “entity.” So, like the object/thing distinction, differentiating an object from an entity is a matter of recognition. In this hierarchy of recognition, the observer either demeans an object—thing—or ennobles it—entity—in the manner of the GCB, but what is observed is always an object.
The Twilight Zone’s “Nightmare at 20,000 Feet” provides a complementary example. In the episode, aerophobic Bob Wilson sees a gremlin tampering with the wing of the plane. The gremlin has apparent subjectivity yet is portrayed as animalistic, somehow less than humanity, and conquerable, as the episode ends with physical proof of the being’s existence—damage to the airplane’s wing. These facts are emphasized by Bob Wilson only referring to the gremlin as a “thing” (
Matheson et al. 1963). The Crystalline Entity is rhetorically portrayed as greater than us, with the gremlin—a
thing—as lesser. Each term is connotatively related to the relationship between it and the observing (human) subject.
Object, then, is a hierarchically neutral term denoting any thing or entity within an ontology. Any completely flat ontology will recognize all objects qua themselves without demeaning or ennobling any object above others.
Thus,
object means a “non-totalizable [i.e., inexhaustible] sum” that “cannot be paraphrased in terms of either its components or effects” and has “a distinct history of formation [and] a finite span” without regard for “mental and non-mental zones,“ such that all instances are ontologically equal with all others—i.e., abstract objects, such as Santa Claus, Narnia, and capitalism are objects just as much as material objects like Keanu Reeves, the Amazon River basin, and my desk are (
Harman 2016, p. 9;
Bryant 2011a, p. 271;
Bennett 2010, p. 24).
Object also does not apply simply to nouns; instead, we must “treat relations adequately as compound objects,” such that “two vicariously linked real objects do form a new object” by generating “a new internal space” meaning that a prepositional phrase signifies an object as much as it does a relationship between two other objects (
Harman 2012, p. 207;
2016). Thus, when objects A and B interact, a third object, A&B, is formed. If this interaction is immaterial, A&B is a spiritual object—as defined in the next section— generated by, but not identical to, the interaction. This point will become important in the section on conatus and shi. Further, object should be understood similarly for both the material and abstract modes of existence, i.e., that objects do not exist equally. Some have more capability and power than others. I have more capability and power than my desk. Capitalism has more capability and power than the color blue. Some objects even experience subjectivity. Yet all of them equally exist, in every case, the toggle switch is “on”.
Having explored the nature of material objects and their relationship to the Real within the OOO framework, I now turn to the realm of abstract objects. As we shall see, all ROs, in the OOO sense, are ultimately abstract. This becomes clear when we consider that a material RO’s withdrawal from all other objects at all times would necessitate a physically impossible scenario—moving way from all other objects while simultaneously getting close to none of them. Therefore, the primary difference between material and abstract objects is the mode by which their SOs present themselves: material bodies or abstract concepts. Also, material objects also have abstract Sensory counterparts. Consider the following sentence:
On the shelves above my L-shaped desk, I have a few dozen books and several knickknacks, including ceramic bowls, model owls, and Doctor Who collectibles. As you read that sentence, you developed a rudimentary concept of my desk and work area. I could give more information, and your concept would become more accurate, but it would never become either the Real desk or the material Sensory desk. Nevertheless, you think of my work area. For abstract objects, we only have the RO—e.g., the Real capitalism—and concepts—each person’s understanding of capitalism, which range from rudimentary to detailed but never exhaust the Real capitalism. Thus, what Harmon says of material interaction is true of all interaction: “When one object comes into contact with another, it cannot perfectly replicate the form of the first” (
Harman 2018b, p. 105).
3.3. Spiritual
The first step in defining spiritual, is to note that I am attempting to define the term outside of any single religious understanding of spirituality and hope to define it in a way that satisfies any pre-existing understanding. That is to say that I am not defining G/god(s), angels, demons, djin, genus loci, ghosts, or any other particular spiritual object but rather the nature of immaterial or intangible objects that exist qua themselves prior to perception. To attempt the former would be to take sides in a way that would be unfair to people who do not share my religious history or affiliations and to spiritual objects themselves. This attempt would also require the attempt to prove the personhood of some subset of (non-human) spiritual objects—an undertaking I support but that is outside the scope of this paper. Therefore, we should, as I briefly mentioned in the section on Sacred Realism, understand the spiritual as being that which has to do with the properties of or direct interaction with ROs. In this way, spiritual aspect (or spirit) is the equivalent to the Harmanian RO and spiritual object is the spirit of a strictly abstract object. Thus, the only significant difference between this definition and the standard definition of spiritual is that in most cases, the term is reserved for entities rather than objects, a difference discussed in the previous section. In Harmanian terms, the spirit is that which withdraws from perception or the inexhaustible aspect of an object. Some spiritual objects are—as mentioned above and discussed in detail in the next section—relational; other spiritual objects are not relations, but can be related with, such as the number 2, Santa Claus, and capitalism.
At this point, one might mistakenly assume that the spiritual realm is the domain of potential, yet undiscovered relationships between material objects. This, however, is not the case. Were that true, the spiritual would not be withdrawn as it would be accessible via the discovery of new relationships, a notion that contradicts the core tenets of Speculative Realism. The potential of an object is better understood to be the collective phase space of all the powers of an object, as described in the section on OOO. Spirits are the Real aspect of the object, which exists independently of the human mind. This aligns with Harman’s perspective, suggesting that spiritual aspects are an inherent aspect of material objects. I extrapolate this to include all abstract objects. We should also avoid conflating spirituality with potency or having particular mental capabilities. Conflating an object’s spirituality or an aspect of an object with a set of capabilities would build a hierarchy into ontology. Objects that had only abstract aspects would belong to one plane of existence. In contrast, objects with both material and abstract aspects would belong to multiple planes and, therefore, be existentially unequal to monoplanar abstract objects. After all, as soon as a second plane is introduced, a Cartesian grid gains a z-axis. This would defeat the purpose of a flat ontology.
The spiritual must also have an intangibility and ineffability to it. This point is evident because every instance of the spiritual in mythology, religion, or philosophy has included these elements. While many gods—e.g., Jesus, Vishnu, and Zeus—have taken on material forms, it is always with the caveat that they are not showing their whole selves. Jesus is the aspect of the Judeo-Christian God that took on flesh compared to the other aspects of the Trinity. Vishnu reincarnated many times, each different from the others except in spirit. Zeus took on many physical—often nonhuman—forms. If the spiritual were tangible or effable, there would, in some religion or mythology, be a way to touch it or exhaustively describe it, but there is none.
Finally, to discuss the difference between the spiritual and the conceptual, while both are types of abstract objects, spiritual objects are Harmanian ROs and thus exist outside minds, while concepts, being abstract SOs, exist within them. In the previous section, I pointed out the difference between capitalism qua itself and our individual conceptions of it. Now, I name this difference. Capitalism qua itself, being an RO, is a spiritual object. My conception of it, and yours, and your neighbor’s, are the SOs that act as vicars between it and each of us. Both spiritual objects and concepts are abstract. However, spiritual objects exist independently of any individual mind, while concepts exist within a single mind as that mind’s model of the objects it interacts with, whether material or abstract.
